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The Economics of Anticipatory Adjudication 
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner 
Introduction 
A bedrock principle of the judicial power of the United States is that federal 
courts may decide concrete cases onlynot hypothetical ones that may or may 
not develop into real cases sometime in the future. This principle has been 
inferred from Article III of the U.S. Constitution, which describes the jurisdiction 
of federal courts in terms of cases or controversies (considered synonyms), 
and has become embodied in a host of subsidiary principles. Thus, federal courts 
are not empowered to render advisory opinions; to decide lawsuits that are moot 
in the sense that a judgment would not give the party obtaining it a concrete 
beneÞt, or that are unripe (premature); to entertain a case brought by someone 
who, because he has not been injured or could not be tangibly beneÞted by win-
ning the suit, is said to lack a personal stake in the outcome and hence cannot 
establish his standing to sue; to decide a collusive (friendly) suit, that is, one 
where the parties interests are not really adverse; or to decide a hypothetical 
case.1 Federal courts are supposed to wait for an actual case to arise from a 
violation of law that has inßicted, or at the minimum is about to inßict, tangible 
harm on the party bringing the suit, who if he wins will be able to prevent or 
reduce the harm or shift the cost, or some of it at least, to someone else.2 
Yet there are many seeming exceptions. Declaratory judgments often resolve 
questions involving legal rights or duties before a party has taken any action that 
might violate anyones legal rights. A related procedure, the suit to quiet title, 
permits a party to sue to remove a cloud on his title to real property so that he 
can act free of any claim to the property. A party to a contract who announces 
that he intends to break the contract in the future can be sued today (in federal 
court if a federal jurisdictional basis such as diversity of citizenship is present) for 
anticipatory breach even though, the time for his performance not having 
arrived, no actual breach can yet have occurred and, if he changed his mind, an 
actual breach might never occur. A litigant in federal as in state court can move 
for a preliminary injunction to head off anticipated as well as actual harm. The 
doctrine of collateral estoppel gives Þndings of fact made in one proceeding 
preclusive effect in future proceedings. Persons and Þrms subject to 
administrative regulations often can sue to enjoin enforcement of a regulation or 
have it declared invalid even though the regulation has not yet been applied to 
                                                 
1 For a helpful discussion of the doctrines derived from Article III that we discuss in this 
paper, see Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the Case or 
Controversy Requirement, 93 Harvard Law Review 297 (1979). 
2 This description doesnt quite Þt the case where the plaintiV is the prosecutor, whether a 
public prosecutor or a private bounty hunter; but in either case the plaintiV can be conceived of 
as a representative of the actual victims of the violation. 
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them, and if it were applied to them they could get it invalidated in the suit 
brought to require them to comply with it or to punish them for their 
noncompliance. Agency staff render legal advice (as in the Securities and 
Exchange Commissions no-action letters or the Internal Revenue Services 
private letter rulings) and sometimes the agencies themselves render advisory 
opinions. Agencies are also empowered to issue declaratory orders, the 
administrative equivalent of declaratory judgments. 
States are not bound by the limitations that Article III has been interpreted to 
impose on federal courts, and ten states allow their highest courts to render 
advisory opinions, at the request of the legislature or the governor, on the 
constitutionality of newly enacted state statutes or on other important issues. 
Federal administrative agencies, whether they are independent or part of the 
executive branch, are not subject to Article III either, and besides issuing advi-
sory opinions many of them promulgate rules before a violation of the norm 
embodied in the rule has occurredunlike common law courts, which to avoid 
criticism that they are acting prospectively, like a legislature or an agency, 
invariably apply even a newly declared norm to the litigants in the case before 
them and usually apply it to litigants in all pending cases. Preventive detention, 
for example refusing on the basis of a preliminary hearing to admit to bail a 
person accused of crime but not yet tried or convicted, is a form of anticipatory 
adjudication when bail is denied on the ground that the accused poses a danger 
to the community. 
So what is going on? Obviously, much litigation (and related activity of a 
judicial or quasi-judicial character) is anticipatory, yet there is a reluctance to 
allow such litigation routinely. Does this reluctance make sense? Is the pattern of 
permission and prohibition sketched above coherent? Those are the issues 
discussed in this paper, along with such subsidiary questions as the following: 
Why do advisory opinions dealing with the constitutionality of state statutes and 
regulations have less precedential signiÞcance than opinions in real cases? 
Why does the Tax Court, which is not an Article III court, refuse to issue 
advisory opinions, while the Internal Revenue Service does issue them, in the 
form of its private letter rulings? Administrative agencies that have adjudicative 
powers, such as the Federal Trade Commission, nevertheless issue declaratory 
orders much less frequently than courts issue declaratory judgments; why this 
difference? We use economic analysis not only to answer these and other speciÞc 
questions but also to bring out the commonality among issues that lawyers often 
place in unrelated doctrinal pigeonholes, to cast the light of economics on an area 
quintessentially of technical law,3 and to explore the possibility that here as 
elsewhere the law makes more economic sense than most judges, lawyers, and 
                                                 
3 Law-school courses on federal jurisdiction or federal courts are redoubts of lawyers law, so 
one is not surprised that the subject matter of such courses has been largely ignored by 
economists. 
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law professors believe. An interesting question that we do not discuss is why the 
use of anticipatory adjudication is (as it appears to be) growing relative to ex post 
adjudication. 
It may seem obvious, and therefore not worth discussion, why resolving legal 
disputes before anyone is hurt would be, with only the rarest exceptions, a bad 
idea. It would consume potentially enormous resources by requiring courts to 
decide hypothetical, contingent, inchoate, premature, abstract, not yet fully 
developed disputes that, left alone by the courts for a time, might not require ju-
dicial resolution at all. In addition to multiplying the resources consumed in 
litigation and judicial decision making, anticipatory adjudication would (it may 
seem) inevitably increase the amount and hence the cost of judicial error.4 There 
is greater risk of deciding a case incorrectly when there is little or no factual 
record and questions of injury, of damages, and of the social costs and beneÞts of 
the defendants and the plaintiffs activities are therefore hypothetical. 
But this is not the whole story. Anticipatory adjudication can provide vital 
information to Þrms or individuals uncertain whether a proposed course of 
action will expose them to liability in damages or to criminal or other penalties. 
Removing uncertainty on this score can confer two beneÞts. Some persons who 
would have run the risk of sanctions will decide not to do so if a court declares 
that their proposed actions are indeed unlawful. The harm that the action would 
have created as well as the cost of administering sanctions to the actor is thereby 
averted. And other persons, who would be deterred from acting by the risk of 
sanctions, will act if the court gives them a green light, and the result may be 
socially as well as privately beneÞcial action. Clearly, we face a complicated set 
of tradeoffs, which an economic model may help to sort out. 
I. A Model of Optimal Anticipatory Litigation 
Our analysis5 begins with the assumption that the legal consequences (which 
may of course depend on factual consequences) of a given action are uncertain. 
Otherwise an advisory opinion, a declaratory judgment, or any other form of 
                                                 
4 The costs of a judicial system can usefully be decomposed into administrative and error 
costs. 
5 Which borrows from Steven Shavells and Louis Kaplows pioneering analysis of the value 
of information provided by lawyers advice rendered in advance of the clients taking an action 
that might be sanctioned. See Shavells articles Legal Advice about Contemplated Acts: The 
Decision to Obtain Advice, Its Social Desirability, and Protection of ConÞdentiality, 17 Journal of 
Legal Studies 123 (1988), and Liability and the Incentive to Obtain Information about Risk, 21 
Journal of Legal Studies 259 (1992); also Kaplow and Shavell, Private versus Socially Optimal 
Provision of Ex Ante Legal Advice, 8 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 306 (1992). We 
modify their analysis to allow both for the possibility of a greater likelihood of legal error when a 
case is decided before rather than after a party acts and for the diVerence in costs of anticipatory 
and ex post adjudication itself. Our formal sapproach to legal error follows that of A. Mitchell 
Polinsky and Steven Shavell, Legal Error, Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey the Law, 5 
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 99 (1989). 
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anticipatory adjudication would provide no information and would therefore be 
all costs and no beneÞts. Thus, if A is considering poisoning B, As obtaining a 
decision in advance on the lawfulness of the act would confer no beneÞt. As A 
already knows that his action is unlawful, an advisory opinion would give him 
no new information.6 But let A be considering taking an action that would violate 
a possibly unconstitutionalnot certainly unconstitutional or certainly 
constitutionallaw, and he would beneÞt from learning with certainty whether 
the law was unconstitutional, because the information would enable him to 
optimize his actions. Or suppose that he is considering putting up a building on 
property that he believesbut again without certaintythat he owns. He would 
beneÞt from a resolution of any potential dispute over who owns the property 
before he begins construction. Or suppose he would like to use a new technology 
but is unsure whether it would infringe Bs patent. Knowing the answer to this 
question would be valuable information for A to have before he decides whether 
to use the technology. 
A fundamental question is why, if the problem is uncertainty, the private 
market for legal services is not the solution. A lawyer can advise on the 
likelihood of a particular course of action resulting in litigation adverse to his 
client and we suppose could guarantee his advice, although this is not important 
because we assume risk neutrality.7 There are two answers to this question. The 
Þrst and less important is that a judge may be a better predictor of the outcome 
of future litigation over an issue than a private lawyer, not because the judge is 
smarter but because he is predicting his own behavior or that of a member of his 
club (the judiciary); a countervailing factor is that the lawyer may have more 
information than the judge because the client will level with his lawyer, thanks 
to the attorney-client privilege. The more important consideration is that, 
provided the anticipatory adjudication has preclusive effect, that is, that it cannot 
be reversed by subsequent adjudication after the anticipated act materializes, the 
judge does not merely produce a different probability of a given outcome for the 
party to consider; he changes a probability distribution into a certainty, and this 
can affect behavior even if everyone is risk neutral. For example, a person who 
would not have acted if the probability of his being sanctioned afterward were .3 
may act if anticipatory adjudication reduces that probability to zero, and a 
person who would have acted if the probability of his being sanctioned 
afterward were .7 may decide not to act if he discovers through anticipatory 
adjudication that his probability of being sanctioned is 1. It is no answer that the 
lawyer could guarantee his advice, because he will do it only for a fee equal to 
the risk that he assumes. This means that the client will have to pay a fee equal to 
                                                 
6 It might give B information that he is in danger of being poisoned, and also increase the 
likelihood that A will be apprehended and punished if he succeeds in murdering B. These 
however are not private beneÞts to A and would not motivate him to seek an advisory opinion.  
7 The provision of such advice by lawyers is the principal subject of the papers by Kaplow 
and Shavell referred to in note 5 above. 
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the expected cost of the ex post sanction, and if, we assume risk neutrality, will 
thus have gained nothing from the guarantee.8 
a. The Social Value of Acting 
Let A be contemplating an action that would yield him a beneÞt of X. Let pe 
be the subjective probability to A that this action would result in a damages 
judgment, Þne, forfeiture, permanent injunction, or other legal sanction against A 
that would impose upon him a cost of D. We assume that D > X in present-value 
terms, so that, if pe = 1, A would not take the action; it would yield him a net loss. 
But pe = 1 is counterfactual in our analysis; we assume that 0 < pe < 1 because 
either it is uncertain that a court would uphold the validity of the law that A will 
be accused of violating or As act may fall outside the scope of a valid law. To 
simplify exposition we ignore other possible forms of uncertainty, including 
uncertainty over whether the action will inßict injury (and if so how much) and 
will actually precipitate a civil or criminal lawsuit, a possibility that we take up 
later, however, and we continue to assume that the parties are risk neutral. 
If A takes the action, he faces not only a possibility of having to pay D but 
also a potential cost C of defending himself against a lawsuit brought in order to 
impose D on him. Nevertheless he will take the action as long as the present 
value of his expected net income from it, Ve, is positive, where 
 Ve = X  peD  Ce. (1) 
Ve is net expected income from an action taken by A but not adjudicated, at a 
cost to A of Ce, until after A acts. We call adjudication that occurs after A acts ex 
post adjudication and denote it by the subscript e.9 The typical civil suit or 
                                                 
8 To explain, suppose the lawyer believes that the probability is .7 that a court will Wnd As 
act lawful after A acts. For a fee, the lawyer might guarantee to pay As damages in the event the 
court Wnds against A after he acts. Given this guarantee, A can act without fear of liability. But 
this is not equivalent to anticipatory adjudication because A will have to pay an up front fee for 
the guarantee equal to .3 multiplied by damages plus litigation costs. Putting risk aversion to one 
side, this fee eliminates any beneWt from the guarantee since As expected damages from acting 
and risking paying damages if a court Wnds his act unlawful is equal to the fee A pays for the 
guarantee. In contrast, anticipatory adjudication just requires that A pay litigation costs for 
obtaining information on whether he can act without fear of liability. 
9 In contrast, the subscript a refers to anticipatory adjudication. So pa for example is the 
probability that anticipatory adjudication will Þnd As prospective action unlawful. 
It may be helpful to the reader if we deÞne at this point the principal notation used in the 
paper: 
X = the beneÞt from As act;  
pe = the probability that ex post adjudication will sanction As act; 
1, 2 = Type I and Type II error, respectively; 
pa = the probability that anticipatory adjudication will Wnd As prospective act unlawful;  
D = the amount of damages A will pay if sanctioned ex post; 
Ce, Ca = the social cost of ex post and anticipatory litigation, respectively; 
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criminal prosecution is ex post in this sense because it is Þled after the defendant 
has acted. We can see from equation (1) that A is more likely to act and risk 
sanctions the lower are pe (the probability of being sanctioned), D (the cost of the 
sanction), and Ce (the cost of the ex post adjudication) and the greater X (the 
beneÞt from acting) is. 
In order to evaluate the social gain or loss from anticipatory adjudication, we 
make the further assumption that Ve equals not only As net income but also 
societys expected welfare when the court decides the lawfulness of As act after 
he acts. Thus, X, pe, D, and Ce denote both private and social values of these 
variables. This makes our initial deÞnition of Ce incomplete, because it excludes 
both the plaintiffs (or prosecutors) litigation costs and the costs of the judicial 
system itself to the extent that they are not fully borne by the litigants, in the 
form of court fees. Yet it does not follow that Ce will in every case understate the 
full costs of dispute resolution. A judicial decision may create a precedent that 
provides valuable information to other parties, and this external beneÞt would 
require a downward adjustment in the social costs of litigating As dispute. 
Provisionally, we assume that these factors cancel out, so that Ce equals both the 
private and social costs of ex post adjudication. It would be simple enough, 
however, to adjust Ce both for the plaintiffs costs and for the precedential 
signiÞcance of the decision. RedeÞne Ce as As litigation cost, and let g be a 
parameter that transforms Ce into a social cost. If the litigation has little 
precedential signiÞcance, if the plaintiff incurs substantial litigation costs, and if 
there are signiÞcant public subsidies for litigation, g is likely to exceed 1. But if 
the precedential signiÞcance of the decision is great, g could be less than 1 and 
could even take a negative value. A further complication is the possibility of an 
out-of-court settlement after A acts. To skirt it, we assume that if A is sued he can 
settle by paying an amount equal to peD + Ce. This makes Ve the same whether A 
litigates or settles.  
We assume that if the court either invalidates the law or holds it inapplicable 
to A, D = 0; that is (in a civil litigation), A has incurred no damages liability. This 
may seem unrealistic. A perfectly lawful action can cause damage, in the sense 
of harm, even if the damage does not result in an award of legal damages or in 
any other legal sanction. Moreover, the amount of damage, especially in relation 
to the beneÞt to the actor (X), may affect the courts decision on the validity or 
application of the law. We can model this case by supposing that As action 
causes either high damage (Dh) with a probability pe or low damage (Dl) with a 
probability (1  pe), where Dh > X > Dl ≥ 0. Then peD in equation (1) would 
become peDh + (1  pe)Dl. Under a negligence regime A would be subject to 
                                                                                                                                                 
Ve, Va = the expected social value of As act when adjudication takes place after (ex post 
adjudication) and before (anticipatory adjudication) A acts, respectively; and 
Wa = the expected private value to A of anticipatory adjudication. 
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sanction only if his act caused high damage (deÞned as harm that exceeded the 
beneÞt), while under strict liability he would be subject to sanction even if his act 
caused only low damage. As the more complicated model does not change any 
of our important results, we use the simpler approach for the most part, which 
assumes that Dl = 0. 
b. A Is Deterred from Acting in the Absence of Anticipatory Adjudication 
1. Social benefits and costs. Let Ve < 0, so that A decides not to act and by acting 
risk the sanction. As decision is socially efÞcient because it is based on the full 
expected beneÞts and costs of the act given the information available at the time 
and because Ce reßects both As and societys cost of ex post litigation. Now 
suppose that a court is willing to decide before A acts whether his prospective 
action would be lawful or not. Assume that the courts decision will be deÞnitive. 
Then if it Þnds As action lawful, A will undertake it, because he will gain X and 
face neither the prospect of being sanctioned nor the prospect of incurring 
litigation costs. Conversely, if the court Þnds the prospective action to be 
unlawful, A will refrain because otherwise he would incur Dwhich by 
assumption is greater than Xwith certainty and would incur litigation costs to 
boot. 
We assume that the court has less information before than after A acts, 
because in anticipatory adjudication the court must decide without the beneÞt of 
information generated by the act itself. Such information might enable more 
accurate measurement of the harms and beneÞts of an act (because they would 
be realized, rather than merely predicted) and a more precise characterization of 
the act, which might in turn enable a more conÞdent determination of whether 
the act was prohibited. 
The information deÞcit that characterizes anticipatory adjudication requires 
us to consider carefully the two types of error that might occur in such 
adjudication. We deÞne 1 as the probability that a court will Þnd As prospective 
act lawful but would have found it unlawful had it decided the case after A 
acted, and 2 as the probability that a court will Þnd As prospective act unlawful 
but would have found it lawful had it decided the case after A acted. Thus 1 is 
Type I error (the probability of Þnding a guilty person innocent), while 2 is 
Type II error (the probability of Þnding an innocent person guilty). Of course 
both types of error occur in full-ßedged, ex post adjudication as well as in 
anticipatory adjudication, and although we ignore that possibility in the formal 
analysis, 1 and 2 can be interpreted as the incremental Type I and Type II error 
incurred in anticipatory adjudication. We assume, plausibly, that (1  1) > 2, 
that is, that the probability that anticipatory adjudication will correctly Þnd As 
act to be unlawful is greater if ex post adjudication would have found As act 
unlawful rather than lawful. To simplify further, we take as given the levels of 
legal error in anticipatory adjudication and, therefore, do not examine the social 
Economics of Anticipatory Adjudication 9
and private decisions to spend resources to reduce errors and improve the ac-
curacy of such adjudication.10 
The difference between Type I and Type II error is particularly important in 
criminal litigation, where the latter is deemed to be much more costly than the 
former. In contrast, in the civil context Type I and Type II errors are usually 
assumed to be equally costly.11 Nevertheless the distinction between the two 
types of error is important in explaining the pattern of anticipatory adjudication 
in the civil area. 
Since anticipatory adjudication will inform A whether he will have to pay 
damages (or incur an equivalent legal sanction) if he acts, we can write Va, the 
expected beneÞt to society (which, as we show shortly, differs from As expected 
beneÞt), if A obtains a determination respecting the lawfulness of his conduct 
prior to acting, as 
 Va = (1  pa)X  pe1D  Ca, (2) 
where 
 (1  pa) = (1  pe)(1  2) + pe1. (3) 
The Þrst set of terms on the right-hand side of equation (2) is the gross expected 
beneÞt from anticipatory adjudication: the beneÞt (X) from As act discounted by 
the probability 1  pa that anticipatory adjudication will Þnd the act lawful. The 
probability (1  pa) is, in turn, as shown in equation (3), a positive function of the 
probability 1  pe that As act would have been found lawful if litigated ex post,12 
the probability that anticipatory adjudication would reach the same result (which 
equals one minus Type II error), and the probability of Type I error. 
To calculate the net expected beneÞt of anticipatory adjudication, we must 
subtract from the gross beneÞt both pe1D, which is the expected harm that 
results when anticipatory adjudication mistakenly exonerates a litigant who 
should be sanctioned, and Ca, the cost of anticipatory adjudication. We expect 
that Ca ≤ Ce, because the availability of more information after than before a 
party acts is likely to increase the time devoted to discovery, pretrial 
maneuvering and motions, and the trial itself. Lack of information sometimes 
increases the cost of litigation because the parties hire more experts or 
                                                 
10 Two recent papers by Kaplow and Shavell investigate the optimal expenditure of resources 
to reduce error and improve the accuracy of adjudication. See Kaplow and Shavell Accuracy in 
the Determination of Liability (1992) and Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages (1992). 
11 The diVerence between these weightings of Type I and Type II error is captured in the 
diVerent standards of proof. The prosecutor in a criminal case must prove guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and this requirement creates a greater probability of Type I than of Type II 
error. The civil plaintiV need prove liability only by a bare preponderance of the evidence, 
implying a virtually equal probability of the two types of error. 
12 We have ∂(1  pa)/∂(1  pe) = 1  2  1 > 0 (from the assumption that (1  1) > 2. 
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commission elaborate studies to estimate beneÞts and harms from the proposed 
course of action, but this is exceptional. Another reason to expect Ce to exceed Ca 
is that the stakes are apt to be higher in ex post litigation because an injury has 
occurred (see part 2.c). As a by-product, both Type I and Type II error may fall. 
These considerations are reßected in our model, since the differences between 
the costs of litigating anticipatory and ex post cases, and the incremental error of 
anticipatory adjudication, are among the variables that we take into account. 
By assumption, A would not act if he could not determine in advance (that is, 
though anticipatory adjudication) that his act would not subject him to sanctions. 
So societys net expected beneÞt without anticipatory litigation is zero. With 
anticipatory litigation it can be positive, negative, or zero. As is obvious from 
equation (2), as well as intuitive, it is more likely to be positive the greater X and 
the smaller pe, 1, 2, and Ca are. Alternatively, if there is very little doubt that As 
act is unlawful and likely to cause signiÞcant harm (that is, if both pe and D are 
high), the principal effect of anticipatory adjudication will be to allow some 
people to get away with their unlawful acts because of legal error. This may 
explain the traditional unavailability of anticipatory adjudication in criminal 
matters, which tend to have a high pe and D (our poisoning case). 
2. Private versus social benefits. The private and social beneÞts of anticipatory 
adjudication need not be equal. Anticipatory adjudication enables A to avoid any 
sanction for an unlawful act, for if he loses the anticipatory suit he will refrain 
from the act. From As perspective, therefore, D drops out of the picture; the only 
cost of anticipatory litigation to A is Ca. As expected gain is merely X discounted 
by the probability that the court will Þnd his prospective act to be lawful. Hence 
As (≠ societys) net expected gain of anticipatory litigation, or Wa, is given by 
 Wa = (1  pa)X  Ca (4) 
which differs from the social gain in equation (2) in that pe1D has dropped out, 
so that Wa  Va = pe1D. The difference is caused by the fact that Type I error 
creates a private beneÞt to A (equal to p1X) but a social loss [equal to p1(X  
D)]. The greater are p, Type I error, and D, the greater (other things being equal) 
will be the difference between As private gain from anticipatory adjudication 
and societys gain. 
Criminal prosecution again provides a helpful illustration. If Type 1 and Type 
II error are assumed to be inversely related, then the effort to avoid Type II error 
in criminal litigation implies that Type I error is high in such litigation; and we 
have already noted that p and D are also likely to be high. Therefore Va is likely 
to be negative while As private beneÞt from anticipatory adjudication, Wa, could 
well be positive. It would be crazy if, in our poisoning hypothetical, the would-
be poisoner could obtain an anticipatory adjudication in which the prosecutor 
would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the poisoner would be 
guilty of murder. Since a fully anticipatory criminal adjudication would take 
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place before any criminal act was actually committed, a judgment of guilty 
would not result in the imposition of punishment; hence there would be no 
reason to employ the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 
which is motivated by the heavy costs of criminal punishment to the convicted 
person. But this means that anticipatory criminal adjudication wouldnt look 
much like criminal adjudication. We shall return to this point in part II, when we 
discuss preenforcement judicial challenges to statutes and administrative rules.  
As equation (4) shows, A beneÞts from Type I error but not from Type II 
error, since errors of the latter type are against A.13 Whether on balance A 
beneÞts from legal error is therefore unclear, although society clearly loses 
because both types of error impose social costs. 
Our emphasis on the risk of error (or, more precisely, on the incremental risk 
of error) in anticipatory litigation may suggest a choice between litigation now, 
in advance of action, and litigation later. But remember that we are assuming in 
this part of the paper that if anticipatory adjudication is refused A will be 
deterred from acting by the threat of sanctions and there will be no subsequent 
adjudication. The presence of error costs in anticipatory adjudication may 
nevertheless make it socially undesirable to issue an advisory opinion or other 
anticipatory judgment that creates a positive probability that A will act. But what 
if the court does not know whether A will not act unless it renders an 
anticipatory adjudication? In that case the beneÞt of anticipatory adjudication 
will be a weighted average of the beneÞts when, in the absence of anticipatory 
adjudication, A does act (the case considered in the next section) and when, in 
that absence, he doesnt act, with the weights equal to the probabilities of each of 
the two possibilities. 
Our analysis implies that the private incentive to seek an anticipatory 
adjudication is always greater than the social incentive [because equation (4) has 
a greater value than equation (2)].14 Indeed, unless the private cost of litigation 
(Ca) is very great, courts would be ßooded with requests for anticipatory 
adjudication by persons deterred from acting by the prospect of being 
sanctioned. We therefore predict that courts will be given greater discretion to 
refuse to hear a case before than after a party acts, enabling them to turn down 
                                                 
13 Since (1  pa) = (1  pe)(1  2) + pe1, it follows that Wa is increasing in 1 but decreasing 
in 2. 
14 This is true as well in the alternative model in which As act causes damages of either Dh or 
Dl and Dh > X > Dl. Then the net social beneÞt of anticipatory adjudication equals (1  pa)X  (1  
pe)(1  2)Dl  pe1Dh  Ca, and As private beneÞt (which substitutes Dl for Dh) equals (1  pa)(X 
 Dl)  Ca. With anticipatory adjudication, A always pays Dl if he acts (and never pays Dh 
because, if a court determines that his prospective act would if carried out cause actionable harm 
equal to Dh, he will not act). Since Dh > Dl, As private beneÞt exceeds the social beneÞt. Again 
Type I error (1) is a private beneÞt (∂Wa/∂1 = pe(X  Dl) > 0) but a social cost (∂Va/∂1 = pe(X 
 Dh) < 0). 
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requests for anticipatory adjudication when the private gain is positive but the 
social gain negative. SpeciÞcally, assuming that courts are guided by efÞciency 
concerns we expect them to turn down more such requests the greater pe1D is. 
For if the private value of anticipatory adjudication is positive (Wa), the social 
value (Va) is more likely to be negative the greater the probability that As pro-
posed action is in fact illegal, the greater the probability of the courts Þnding the 
proposed action legal in anticipatory adjudication when it is in fact illegal, and 
the greater the harm from (and hence, other things being equal, the more severe 
the sanction for) As act. As we show later, ripeness, mootness, and related 
doctrines provide courts with convenient categories for refusing anticipatory 
adjudication when it is unlikely to be socially beneÞcial. 
The social costs of anticipatory adjudication are ampliÞed if, contrary to our 
assumption that As private cost and the social cost of litigation are equal, the 
latter is greater. Let ce and ca denote As private cost of ex post and anticipatory 
litigation. Then all As who, but for anticipatory adjudication, would choose not 
to act because their net income from acting would be negative (that is, We < 0 
where We is As private value, calculated by substituting ce for Ce) behave 
efÞciently because Ve has an even greater negative value than We when Ce 
replaces ce. The difference between the private and the social gain from 
anticipatory adjudication is also greater when the former nets out ca and the 
latter nets out Ca. For then Wa  Va = pe1D + Ca  ca. In the special (but, as we 
shall see, not always implausible) case in which ca = 0, A will always have a 
positive gain from anticipatory adjudication [see equation (4)] even if the social 
costs (pe1D + Ca) are much greater and make Va < 0 in equation (2). 
c. A Will Act Even If He Cannot Obtain an Anticipatory Adjudication 
We turn to the case where, because Ve (the private and social value of As act 
when only ex post adjudication is available to determine its lawfulness15) is 
positive, society wants A to act even if he cannot obtain an anticipatory 
adjudication, and to take his chances on being sanctioned later. The expected 
social gain from anticipatory adjudication in this case is the difference between 
Va and Ve: 
 Va  Ve = pe(1  1)D  paX + (Ce  Ca), (5) 
where 
 pa = pe(1  1) + (1  pe)2. (6) 
The expected beneÞt of anticipatory adjudication equals the probability, pe(1  
1), of preventing a person from taking a socially harmful action multiplied by 
                                                 
15 Recall from equation (1) that we assume that societys and As cost of ex post litigation are 
equal, so that Ve denotes both societys and As value of acting without anticipatory adjudication. 
Economics of Anticipatory Adjudication 13
the harm avoided (D) by preventing the act, plus the likely savings in litigation 
costs from substituting anticipatory for ex post adjudication. The value of 
encouraging a socially beneÞcial action disappears, because by hypothesis such 
action would be taken if anticipatory adjudication were unavailable, assuming 
the private beneÞt exceeded the private cost. 
Other things being equal, this expected beneÞt is greater the greater pe, D, 
and Ce  Ca are and the smaller is the probability of Type I error in anticipatory 
adjudication. There is, however, an offsetting cost from anticipatory adjudication 
in the case under consideration: the beneÞt (X) that is given up both when a 
court correctly, and when it erroneously, condemns a proposed action that, but 
for the anticipatory adjudication, would have gone forward.16 To calculate the 
net expected beneÞt of anticipatory adjudication we must subtract this expected 
cost of paX. 
There are several interesting comparisons between the case where A will not 
act in the absence of anticipatory adjudication [equation (2)] and the case where 
he will [equation (5)]:  
1. As in the earlier case, the private gain from anticipatory adjudication 
exceeds the social gain. The private gain equals  
 Wa  Ve = peD  paX + Ce  Ca (7) 
which exceeds Va  Ve by pe1D, the expected private beneÞt from averting, 
through legal error in anticipatory adjudication, a deserved sanction that would 
have been imposed ex post.17 So again the number of such persons requesting 
anticipatory adjudication will exceed the efÞcient number. 
2. Legal error reduces the social beneÞt from anticipatory adjudication both 
when a person will act in the absence of such adjudication and when he will not. 
Moreover, the effect of changes in legal error are identical for (2) and (5). A unit 
increase in Type I error reduces the expected gain from anticipatory adjudication 
by pe(D  X), and a unit increase in Type II error reduces the expected gain by (1 
                                                 
16 It may seem odd to worry about a lost beneÞt from a murder or rape that a court correctly 
prevents. But since we have shown that criminal acts are poor candidates for anticipatory 
adjudication, the lost beneÞts in (5) are not likely to involve those types of activity.  
17 Another factor that would increase the diVerence between Wa  Ve and Va  Ve is a positive 
diVerence (if one exists) between the social and private costs of anticipatory adjudication. 
However, if social cost also exceeds private cost in ex post adjudication, the net eVect of the 
diVerences between the social and private cost of litigation on the diVerence between Wa  Ve (or, 
more correctly, Wa  We where We is as deÞned below) and Va  Ve is uncertain. To see this, let ce 
and ca denote private costs of litigation and deÞne We = X  peD  ce. as As private gain from 
acting when litigation takes place ex post. Va  Ve could exceed Wa  We if Ce  Ca was greater 
than ce  ca, although there is no a priori reason to assume that this will be the case. 
14 Chicago Working Paper in Law & Economics
 pe)X, whether A will or will not go forward with his proposed course of action 
if he does not obtain an anticipatory judgment authorizing it.18  
3. An increase in p, the probability that As act is actually unlawful, will 
reduce the social beneÞt of anticipatory adjudication in the case in which A will 
not act unless anticipatory adjudication is available to him, but it will increase 
the social beneÞt of that adjudication in the case in which A will act if there is no 
anticipatory adjudication.19 The intuition behind this result is that in the former 
case, when Ve < 0, the only potential social gain from anticipatory adjudication is 
giving A a green light to act, and that expected gain is smaller the more likely it 
is that the act is unlawful. In the latter case, where Ve > 0, the social gain from 
such adjudication comes from inducing persons not to act, and that expected gain 
is larger the greater the probability that the contemplated act is unlawful. 
4. The cost of anticipatory adjudication tends to lower its social beneÞt more 
when a person will not act without such adjudication than when he will. In the 
former case, there is a net litigation cost of Ca. In the latter case, the incremental 
cost of anticipatory adjudication will actually be negative if Ce > Ca and everyone 
who acts without anticipatory adjudication is sued afterward. If not everyone 
who acts is sued ex post, or if some of those suits are settled before trial, the 
incremental cost of anticipatory adjudication may be positive notwithstanding 
the assumed greater cost of litigating a dispute after a party acts than before. We 
predict therefore that courts will be more willing to provide anticipatory 
adjudication in cases in which the party is quite likely to act, and to be sued if he 
acts, for then the incremental cost of anticipatory adjudication may be slight or 
even negative. Alternatively, if in the absence of anticipatory adjudication A 
would not act or if he did the parties would be likely to settle out of court, we 
predict that courts will be less willing to provide anticipatory adjudication. If A 
in this situation seeks such an adjudication his suit may be dismissed on the 
ground that it is unripe, that he lacks standing, or that the suit presents no real 
case or controversy. 
5. Suppose that A will act in the absence of anticipatory adjudication only 
because his private cost of litigation ex post is lower than the social costthat is, 
he would not act if he faced Ce instead of ce, where ce < Ce. The social beneÞt of 
anticipatory adjudication, Va  Ve in equation (5), will increase since now Ve is 
negative. Anticipatory adjudication becomes more valuable because it can pre-
vent acts that prospectively have a negative expected value when the full social 
cost of ex post litigation is taken into account. The private beneÞt from 
                                                 
18 The derivatives are ∂Z/∂1 = pe(D  X) < 0 and ∂Z/∂2 = (1  pe)X < 0 where Z = Va 
when A doesnt act and Va  Ve when A does act. 
19 We have ∂Va/∂pe = (1  2)X  1(D  X) < 0 where Ve < 0, and ∂(Va  Ve)/∂pe = (1  
1)(D  X) + 2X > 0 where Ve > 0. Notice, however, that an increase in p has another eVect. It 
makes it more likely that a person will not act. 
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anticipatory adjudication, however, may not change if As litigation cost is less 
than societys cost for both anticipatory and ex post adjudication, and in that 
event the private beneÞt could be less than the social beneÞt. In contrast, we 
showed earlier that for As who will not act in the absence of anticipatory 
adjudication, the private beneÞt of such adjudication will always exceed the 
social beneÞt, even if (indeed especially if) the private cost of litigation is less 
than the social cost. 
The analysis is similar if the ex post sanction A faces (call it d) is less than the 
social damages (D) of his act. This might occur if A lacks suYcient resources to 
pay D. Suppose A will act if he faces ped but not if he faces peD. In that case Ve 
will be negative but since A still acts, ex post adjudication will lead to inefÞcient 
conduct. This increases the social beneÞt of anticipatory adjudication that might 
prevent such conduct. But if A would not act even if the maximum ex post 
sanction that he was able to pay was d, the beneÞt of anticipatory adjudication 
will be unaffected by the discrepancy between D and d. We give an example 
from the criminal law in the next part. 
II. Further Applications of the Model to Legal Doctrines 
We illustrated our model with abbreviated examples of legal rules and 
procedures. We now undertake a fuller examination of legal doctrine in light of 
our economic analysis, emphasizing the commonalities among a number of 
doctrines that lawyers have usually thought unrelated. 
a. Declaratory Judgments 
Were there no error in anticipatory adjudication, its net social beneÞt would 
equal either (1  pe)X  Ca for a party who would not act in the absence of 
anticipatory adjudication, or pe(D  X) + (Ce  Ca) for a party who would act in 
the absence of such adjudication. In the former case the net social beneÞt will be 
positive provided the cost of anticipatory adjudication is less than the expected 
gain from an efÞcient act (an act that would not be sanctioned ex post). In the 
latter case anticipatory adjudication will always create a net social beneÞt except 
in the unlikely event that the cost of such adjudication is much greater than the 
cost of ex post adjudication or the parties are more likely to incur anticipatory 
than ex post adjudication costs, for example because B drops his suit or the 
parties settle after A acts. 
The no-error condition is most likely to be approximated in situations in 
which most or all of the information relevant to deciding the dispute exists 
before A actsand of course in some cases delay in adjudication may result in a 
net loss of relevant information, in which event (contrary to our earlier 
assumption) there will be less rather than more legal error in anticipatory 
compared to ex post adjudication. That extreme case is not necessary to support 
our point. Suppose that Mr. A plans to marry Ms. B but is uncertain whether he 
already is legally married. No additional information would be generated 
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(though we may assume that none would be lost, either) by postponing the 
judicial decision until after A marries B, which in this case may mean that the 
case is never decided.20 Or suppose that A would like to build a house on a parcel 
of land the title to which is uncertain. His going ahead and building will cast no 
additional light on the issue of title. 
These are good cases for the use of the declaratory judgment, and in fact the 
rules concerning the issuance of declaratory judgments seem broadly consistent 
with our analysis of the device, which emphasizes error costs. A federal court 
will not issue such a judgment unless the dispute is fully ripe, a requirement 
normally not satisÞed unless the facts bearing on the plaintiffs entitlement to 
judgment have already occurred, so that the no (incremental) error condition is 
approximated. It has always seemed a bit odd that the courts should insist that 
the declaratory-judgment procedure is fully consistent with Article IIIs 
requirement that federal courts may adjudicate only actual cases and 
controversies. The oddness is dispelled when it is understood that this 
requirement is related to a desire to minimize the error costs of anticipatory 
adjudication by identifying classes of cases, some of them declaratory-judgment 
actions, in which the facts bearing on legal entitlement are in existence rather 
than contingent even though no one has yet been injured, for example by making 
a bigamous marriage or by building on land owned by someone else.21 Even 
where declaratory relief would meet the Article III criteria, the court has 
discretion to refuse to grant it; this is a further safeguard against the use of the 
device to obtain a private gain but impose a social loss. 
Implicit in our model is another economic advantage of declaratory 
judgments. The ordinary ex post lawsuit has two phases: liability and remedy. 
Even when the plaintiff is seeking equitable relief rather than damages, the 
lawyers and the judge will have to spend some time formulating an appropriate 
decree. Because a party seeking a declaratory judgment has not yet acted, 
however, the court only determines liability; it does not specify a coercive 
(equitable) or monetary remedy. Thus, Ca will be small relative to Ce for declara-
tory judgments, and may be absolutely small as well. If the losing party will 
comply once the issue of liability is authoritatively resolved, hein fact both 
                                                 
20 At least if we ignore the possibility that someone may know that A is already married but 
become aware of As plans to marry again only after A marries B. This possibility could be taken 
care of by the courts requiring A to post some sort of public notice before the court will 
adjudicate the question whether A is already married. 
21 In general, the declaratory-judgment technique seems most valuable in controversies in 
which the relevant facts are ascertainable before actual harm has been suVered. Note, Judicial 
Determinations in Nonadversarial Proceedings, 72 Harvard Law Review 723, 731 (1959). 
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parties, plus the courtcan economize on the expense of litigation by seeking 
only declaratory relief.22 
In an effort to put some empirical ßesh on our theoretical skeleton, we 
collected all federal district court opinions in 1991 in cases in which at least one 
party had requested declaratory relief.23 There were 282 such cases in all. The 
largest category, consisting of 97 cases, were insurance cases. This is not 
surprising even though the federal courts jurisdiction over insurance contracts is 
limited essentially to cases in which the parties are citizens of different states. 
Insurance, especially liability insurance, is a favorite area for declaratory 
judgment proceedings. An insurance company that violates its duty to defend 
against any claim within the potential scope of a liability policy that it has issued 
faces a threat of heavy sanctions, including punitive damages. It therefore has a 
strong interest in obtaining a deÞnitive ruling, in advance, concerning the scope 
and application of the policy. Since that scope and application depend entirely 
on the terms of the insurance policy, the nature of the event giving rise to the 
claim in the liability suit, and the nature of that claimall things that will be 
known at the time the declaration is soughtthe error costs of anticipatory 
adjudication are low. 
The second largest category in our sample, consisting of 58 cases, is judicial 
review of administrative action. This category illustrates the last economy of 
declaratory judgments that we identiÞed, for these suits are brought against 
federal agencies, which can be expected to comply with an authoritative judicial 
declaration of the plaintiffs rights. This feature lowers the cost of anticipatory 
relative to ex post litigation because the former avoids the costs of the remedial 
phase of litigation. 
As nearly as we can determine from the opinions, in none of the 170 cases in 
which declaratory relief was granted, but in 14 of the 67 in which it was denied 
(the others not having been Þnally decided by the end of 1991), would 
withholding adjudication have enabled the obtaining of additional information 
bearing on the merits of the suit. 
b. Res Judicata 
The doctrine of res judicata precludes the relitigation by either party of a case 
between them that has resulted in a Þnal judgment on the merits. The doctrine of 
collateral estoppel (which we do not discuss in this paper) precludes the 
relitigation, in what may otherwise be an entirely different kind of case, of a 
speciÞc issue (usually factual) that was actually litigated and determined in a 
case that went to Þnal judgment. These doctrines are anticipatory in the sense 
                                                 
22 In this respect, declaratory judgment proceedings resemble bifurcated liability-damages 
trials, on which see William M. Landes, Sequential versus Unitary Trials: An Economic 
Analysis, 22 Journal of Legal Studies 99 (1993). 
23 Details of our study are available from us on request. 
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that they control or inßuence the outcome of a future lawsuit. They relate to our 
earlier discussion in an even more direct sense, to which we will limit our 
analysis, because an important feature of anticipatory judgments is that they can 
be pleaded as res judicata in a subsequent case. 
Suppose that if A obtains a declaratory judgment, giving him a green light to 
act, and he does act and is sued, and the court decides that the declaratory 
judgment had been issued in error, A will be sanctioned ex postthat is, the 
declaratory judgment will not be given preclusive effect. Since we are assuming 
in this example that ex post litigation reverses an error in anticipatory 
adjudication, it may seem a powerful case for rejecting res judicata as a general 
doctrine, at least in cases where the judgment sought to be given preclusive effect 
was rendered in an anticipatory rather than an ex post litigation. A fuller 
analysis, however, shows that this conclusion is incorrect. 
1. A will not act in the absence of anticipatory adjudication. Consider Þrst the 
situation in which Ve = X  pD  Ce < 0, so that A will not act in the absence of 
anticipatory adjudication. Let pe|a be the (conditional) probability that A will be 
found liable for damages D in ex post litigation if he prevailed in anticipatory 
adjudication. So (recalling that 1  pa is the probability that As act will be found 
lawful in anticipatory adjudication), 
 pe|a = pe1/(1  pa). (8) 
If anticipatory adjudication operated with zero error, or if the judgment in that 
adjudication could be pleaded as res judicata, pe|a would be zero. Otherwise it 
would be positive, but smaller than if A would act without the beneÞt of a 
favorable judgment in the anticipatory adjudication, because pe|a < pe.24 The 
reason that As who are successful in anticipatory adjudication are more likely to 
prevail ex post is not that a court is unwilling to change its mind (we are 
assuming that res judicata is not applied when the Þrst adjudication was antic-
ipatory) but that those As who lose at the anticipatory stage will not act and 
hence will not be sued ex post.25 Only As who win anticipatory suits will 
                                                 
24 From equation (8) it follows that pe|a < pe if 1 < (1  pa). Substituting (3)  for 1  pa and 
rearranging terms yields pe|a < pe if 1 < (1  2). The latter condition holds because we have 
assumed that the probability that a court will Þnd As prospective act lawful is smaller when that 
act would be found unlawful ex post. 
25 For remember that we are discussing here As who will not act without anticipatory 
adjudicationthat is, without prevailing in anticipatory adjudication. The result in the text holds 
even though As loss at the anticipatory stage may be reversed in ex post litigation. The 
probability of As losing the anticipatory adjudication, pa, equals pe(1  1) + (1  pe)2, and the 
probability of As losing ex post given such a loss equals pe(1  1)/pa  which is greater than pe 
since 1 < 1  2. In the class of cases in which A will not act without anticipatory adjudication, 
Ve, the expected value of ex post adjudication, is equal to X  peD  Ce < 0, and will be an even 
greater negative number if A has already lost at the anticipatory stage, since then pe(1  1)/pa 
substitutes for pe. 
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subsequently be sued, and this group is comprised of persons who are less likely 
to be sanctioned ex post than the universe of As who seek and obtain 
anticipatory adjudication.26  
If A wins the anticipatory adjudication, he will act, risking the (now lower) 
probability of being sanctioned ex post.27 Still, the probability is positive, which 
reduces the private as opposed to social value of anticipatory adjudication. 
Earlier we showed that As private value from anticipatory adjudication 
[equation (4)] exceeded the social value because it excluded pe1D, the expected 
harm created by Type I error. If, however, a court can correct its mistake ex post, 
As private value from anticipatory adjudication will equal  
 Wa* = (1  pa)(X  pe|aD  Ce)  Ca (9) 
  = (1  pa)X  pe1D  (1  pa)Ce  Ca. (10) 
Putting to one side the additional cost of ex post litigation [which equals (1  
pa)Ce], we can see that the effect of rejecting res judicata is to align the private 
and social values of anticipatory adjudication [see Va in equation (2)]. 
Ordinarily, a policy that aligns private and social values is socially desirable; 
but for several reasons this is not true here:  
1. Litigating both before and after A acts doesnt alter As behavior. If A wins 
at the anticipatory stage, he acts, even though there is some risk of an ex post 
sanction. If he loses at the anticipatory stage, he refrains from acting. Although 
fewer As will seek anticipatory adjudication, because the net private beneÞts are 
now lower (i.e., Wa* < Wa), those who do seek and obtain it, and receive a 
favorable judgment, will act. Holding them liable later, in an ex post litigation, 
while it will redistribute income to injured victims of legal wrongs, will not 
change the behavior that caused the wrong in the Þrst placeit has already 
occurred. It is true that rejecting res judicata and thus enabling the correction of 
Type I error in anticipatory adjudication would have the effect of penalizing 
wrongful behavior; and it is counterintuitive that imposing an expected penalty 
will not change behavior. All it will do here, however, is affect the decision to 
seek anticipatory adjudication. As long as the judges, properly weighing the 
danger of Type I error and other relevant factors, reject inefÞcient requests (that 
                                                 
26 A numerical example will illustrate. Suppose pe = .4, 1 = .1 and 2 = .1. For a party who 
gets the green light in anticipatory adjudication, the probability that he will be sanctioned ex post 
equals .04/(.6 x .9 + .4 x .01) = .04/.58 =.069 compared to .4 without anticipatory adjudication 
Moreover, the former probability approaches zero as legal error approaches zero regardless of the 
size of pe. 
27 Why A will act is straightforward. Consider the reverse. A gets the green light and decides 
not to act for fear of being sanctioned ex post. But then A would never have sought anticipatory 
adjudication in the Þrst place because the best outcomegetting the green lightwould still have 
a negative value (otherwise he would act) and in addition would impose on him a litigation cost 
of Ca. 
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is, where Va < 0) for anticipatory adjudication, the same As will obtain favorable 
anticipatory judgments, and therefore act, as would do so if the judgment could 
be used as res judicata in an ex post lawsuit. The only (though not necessarily a 
negligible) social saving would come from the decline in the number of request 
for anticipatory adjudications. 
The qualiÞcation as long as the judges, properly weighing the danger of 
Type I error and other relevant factors, reject inefÞcient requests for anticipatory 
adjudication is critical. If judges had no discretion to turn down requests for 
anticipatory adjudication and such decisions could be pleaded as res judicata, the 
number of anticipatory adjudications would exceed the socially efÞcient number. 
By aligning private and social values, rejecting res judicata would reduce the 
demand for and hence the number of socially excessive anticipatory 
adjudications, and the resulting social gain might more than offset the cost of 
additional ex post proceedings. This suggests two hypotheses: The more 
discretion that courts have to deny requests for anticipatory adjudication and 
recall that judges do have discretion to decline to render declaratory relief, even if 
jurisdictional requirements are satisÞed(a) the more likely is the outcome of 
anticipatory adjudication to be treated as res judicata in ex post litigation, and (b) 
the greater is the precedential weight likely to be given to anticipatory 
judgments. Discretion allows judges to eliminate those requests where p1D is 
high and (for this or other reasons) the social value of anticipatory adjudication is 
signiÞcantly below As private value. Without such discretion, courts may 
commit costly mistakes in anticipatory adjudication. One way to limit the 
consequences of such mistakes is to allow them to be corrected ex post by not 
giving anticipatory judgments precedential weight. In declining to give a 
decision much weight as precedent, courts sometimes do cite factors that may 
have denied the earlier court full information, such as that the full consequences 
of the defendants actions could not have been known. 
2. Ex post adjudication involves an expected cost that must be deducted from 
the social value of anticipatory litigation, when as a result of rejecting res judicata 
an ex post adjudication is a predictable error-correction follow-up to anticipatory 
adjudication. If the judgment in the anticipatory adjudication has res judicata 
effect, no ex post suits will be Þled, and the costs of those suits will be saved. If 
every time A wins the anticipatory adjudication he will be sued after he acts, 
anticipatory adjudication will eliminate ex post litigation only if A loses in the 
Þrst stage, so the social value of the device will decline by the expected cost of 
the subsequent litigation [which equals (1  pa)Ce]. More realistically, if A wins 
the anticipatory adjudication he faces a probability rather than a certainty of 
being sued ex post. Moreover, the probability of As losing ex post after he has 
won at the anticipatory stages is lower than pe, which reduces the incentive for a 
plaintiff to sue ex post. And the parties may settle after A wins the anticipatory 
stage, since the outcome at that stage generates information about the likely 
outcome of ex post litigation. When these reÞnements are taken into account our 
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general argumentthat res judicata reduces litigation costsstill holds, but with 
diminished force. 
3. Apart from efÞciency concerns, suppose it is thought a very good thing on 
corrective justice grounds to correct judicial error in order to prevent injurers 
from getting away with not compensating their victims. Even this would be a 
weak reason for refusing to treat anticipatory judgments as res judicata, 
provided that, as argued earlier, anticipatory adjudications with binding effect 
(such as declaratory judgment suits) tend to be limited to disputes in which the 
relevant information exists before a party acts, so that the error costs are unlikely 
to exceed those of ex post adjudication.28 
2. A will act in the absence of anticipatory adjudication. For the party who will act 
in the absence of anticipatory adjudication (that is, for whom Ve > 0), the social 
value of anticipatory adjudication equals pe(1  1)D  paX + (Ce  Ca) [see 
equation (5)]; the private value equals peD  paX + (Ce  Ca) [see equation (7)]; and 
the private exceeds the social value by pe1D. It might seem that the principal 
private and social beneÞt of anticipatory adjudicationpreventing A from 
undertaking a socially harmful actionwould be eliminated (or at least greatly 
reduced) if the actor were not bound by an adverse judgment in the anticipatory 
adjudication, that is, if res judicata were rejected. But this turns out to be false. 
Consider Þrst the case where anticipatory adjudication gives A the green light 
to act. A will act: since pe|a < pe, the expected value of As acting conditional on 
As winning the anticipatory adjudication (which equals X  pe|aD  Ce), exceeds 
Ve > 0. It is true that because of Type I error that we are assuming is corrected in 
ex post litigation, some As who succeeded in anticipatory adjudication will still 
be sanctioned. But, as we showed earlier, ex post sanctions do not prevent 
wrongful acts from occurring. Thus, eliminating res judicata for As who get the 
green light to act in anticipatory adjudication actually reduces social welfare, by 
adding costly ex post litigation with no offsetting efÞciency gain.29 
Now suppose that A loses the anticipatory adjudication. If that outcome 
could be pleaded as res judicata, A would not act; for if he did, he would be 
                                                 
28 Another possible eVect of rejecting res judicata may be to increase the size of legal error in 
anticipatory adjudication. Assuming ex post litigation corrects legal error in anticipatory 
adjudication, there may be less incentive to spend resources to improve accuracy at the 
anticipatory stage. Whether this reduces eYciency is unclear. Greater legal error reduces the value 
of anticipatory adjudication but reducing the expenditures on such adjudication will raise its 
value. 
29 Allowing for the extra cost of litigating ex post if A wins at the anticipatory stage, we have 
Va = (1  pa)(X  Ce)  pe1D  Ca. Both the social (Va  Ve) and private (Wa*  Ve) values of 
anticipatory adjudication equal pe(1  1) D  paX + paCe  Ca. The social value falls because 
equation (5) included Ce  Ca as a beneÞt, since ex post litigation was assumed to be more costly 
than anticipatory litigation. Here Va  Ve includes the smaller and possibly negative savings of 
paCe  Ca. 
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sanctioned with certainty, and we know that X < D. But what if A is not bound 
by the adverse judgment in the anticipatory adjudication? Since the court may 
have mistakenly held As prospective act harmful (thus committing a Type II 
error), might A act in the hope that the court will reverse its error? The answer is 
no; for if A would act in that situation, he would never have requested 
anticipatory adjudication to begin with (nor would an efÞciency-motivated court 
have granted such a request) since both its social and private expected value 
would be negative.30 That is, if anticipatory adjudication has no bearing on 
whether or not A acts, and ex post adjudication always follows As act, 
anticipatory adjudication involves costs but no beneÞts. Granted, the assumption 
that ex post litigation always follow anticipatory adjudication is unrealistic. 
Indeed, since the party who loses the anticipatory adjudication will have an even 
lower probability of winning ex post litigation, he will have a reduced incentive 
to sue ex post, compared with the situation in which anticipatory adjudication is 
unavailable. Still, rejecting res judicata would raise litigation costs overall as long 
as some persons who lost at the anticipatory stage would seek to litigate ex post. 
c. Victim’s Request for Anticipatory Adjudication: Injunctions, the Criminal 
Punishment of Preparatory Acts, and Anticipatory Breach of Contract.  
The focus of part I was on the social and private value of anticipatory 
adjudication to the party who seeks such an adjudication in order to authorize 
him to proceed with some act. What about the party who may be injured by that 
act? Shifting the focus to him is equivalent to asking whether he would prefer 
obtaining an injunction to prevent future harm or waiting until the defendant 
acts and seeking damages for any harm done by the act. While for A the choice is 
between seeking legal permission now and taking his chances on being sued 
later, the choice for B (the potential victim) is between suing now to prevent A 
from acting and suing later to recover damages for the injury inßicted by the act. 
B might request anticipatory adjudication, or, equivalently, an injunction 
against As acting. He would not do this if he thought that A would not act 
without such an adjudication, unless he had a strong desire for a precedent. For 
apart from the cost of suing, the court might make a mistake and Þnd As act 
lawful. Consider Bs options if, even without the go-ahead signal of an 
anticipatory adjudication in As favor, A will act, inßicting harm on B with prob-
ability pe. B will be compensated ex post for his damages, so he has nothing to 
lose from sitting back and waiting for A to act except his litigation costs in the ex 
                                                 
30 If A acts even if loses the anticipatory adjudication, then Ve|a = X  [pe(1  1)/pa]D  Ce > 
0, where [pe(1  1)/pa] is the  probability that A will lose ex post, conditional on losing at the 
anticipatory stage. Multiplying by pa yields paX  pe(1  1)D  paCe > 0, or alternatively pe(1  
1)D  paX + paCe < 0. Then both the social and private value of anticipatory adjudication, which 
equals Va  Ve = Wa*  Ve =pe(1  1)D  paX + (paCe  Ca), are both negative. We also know that 
A will act in the absence of anticipatory adjudication (since Ve > 0 by assumption) and that he will 
act if he wins the anticipatory adjudication, since Ve|a >  Ve > 0. 
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post suit.31 If instead B asks the court to enjoin A before he acts, B faces an 
expected loss of pe1Dhis expected damages (peD) discounted by 1, the 
probability that the court in an anticipatory adjudication will incorrectly Þnd that 
As act is lawful. The offset is the saving in litigation costs from anticipatory 
compared to ex post litigation. Unless those savings are great enough to 
compensate for the expected loss pe1D, B will prefer to seek damages rather than 
an injunction or a declaratory judgment. 
Once we relax some of the assumptions in our model, however, Bs incentive 
to seek anticipatory relief emerges. To begin with, the risk of Type I error is 
reduced by the rule that Þndings and conclusions made in a preliminary-
injunction hearing are tentative and may be reexamined in the full ex post 
litigation that will ensue if the preliminary injunction is denied and A goes ahead 
and acts. However, this rule does not apply to permanent injunctions. 
Also, A may lack the resources to compensate B fully for the harm created by 
As act (or, what amounts to same thing, the damage award rendered in ex post 
litigation is not fully compensatory). Then Bs expected cost of ex post 
adjudication will equal his uncompensated harm (= pe(D  d), where d denotes 
the maximum that A can pay B) plus his litigation costs. These losses may more 
than offset Bs expected loss from Type I error in anticipatory adjudication,32 
especially if that loss is reduced by the rule that Þndings of fact and conclusions 
of law made in the preliminary-injunction hearing are tentative. 
We note several additional points:  
1. Lacking sufÞcient resources to pay Bs damages, A will be more likely to 
act if there is no anticipatory litigation, and hence will be less likely to institute 
such litigation (and more likely to oppose it, when it is instituted by B) because 
he has less to lose from ex post adjudication. 
2. The social interest in anticipatory compared to ex post adjudication is 
greater when A cannot pay Bs full damages, because, if A acts, the social beneÞt 
when adjudication takes place ex post is less than As private beneÞt (that is, X  
peD is less than X  ped). This is the economic rationale for the criminal 
punishment of preparatory acts that inßict no harm (failed attempts, solicitations, 
                                                 
31 Of course, he will be compensated only if he is damaged and the act is unlawful, but that is 
why D must be discounted by pe. We assume that the American rule is in force (no shifting of 
the winning partys attorneys fees to the losing party) and, as earlier, that ex post adjudication 
operates free from legal error. 
32 Bs expected loss from ex post and anticipatory adjudication equal pe(D  d) + Ce and pe1D 
+ Ca respectively so his gain from anticipatory adjudications equals pe(1  1)D  ped + (Ce  Ca), 
which is more likely to be positive the smaller is Type I error, and the larger is D relative to d. If d 
= D (so A can pay Bs full damages) then B will prefer ex post litigation unless Bs extra litigation 
cost (which equals Ce  Ca) oVsets the error costs (pe1D) of anticipatory adjudication. 
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and conspiracies and reckless driving that does not result in an accident),33 a 
form of anticipatory adjudication instituted by the victim (represented by the 
state). For the completed act, D is likely to be far greater than dindeed d will 
often be zero and D very high. The probability that the completed act would be 
unlawful is also very high given that the governments burden in the 
preparatory-act case is the standard prosecutors burden of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Type II error in this form of anticipatory adjudication is fur-
ther minimized by the requirement that the attempt have progressed to the point 
where the defendants intention and capacity to commit the completed crime are 
clear. Conspiracy is punishable at an earlier point but requires proof of 
agreement, the agreement being some evidence that the defendant is actually 
dangerous. 
3. Another form of victim-initiated anticipatory litigation in the criminal area 
is preventive detention. If bail is denied to an accused on the ground that he is 
likely to commit further crimes while he is out on bail awaiting trial, in effect the 
prosecutor as agent of the defendants potential victims is seeking on the basis of 
the bail hearing to prevent damage that may be difÞcult to deter by ex post 
adjudication, since, again, d may be much smaller than D. A complicating factor 
not present in our earlier examples is that the anticipatory adjudication may 
create error costs in the ex post adjudication, since being incarcerated while 
awaiting trial may make it more difÞcult for the defendant to prepare an 
adequate defense.34 
4. Suppose as in the usual criminal case that the net social beneÞt of As acting 
(Ve = X  peD  Ce) is negative, but that A will still act when adjudication is ex 
post because his private beneÞt (We = X  ped  ce) will be positive. Anticipatory 
adjudication is likely to be socially beneÞcial because pe and D  X are high and 
Type II error is low.35 Granted, the fact that Type I error may be high (because it 
is a criminal proceeding) reduces the beneÞt of anticipatory adjudication. Even 
though an acquittal on a charge of attempt, conspiracy, reckless driving, and so 
forth is not a green light to commit the completed crime, A will still act (X  ped > 
0) and cause net harm since, by assumption, Ve is negative. However, with A 
identiÞed as a potential offender, his chances of being apprehended and 
convicted if he goes ahead and commits the completed crime after having been 
acquitted of the attempted crime will rise, so that even in the case where Type I 
error occurs there will be some beneÞt from the anticipatory adjudication. 
                                                 
33 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 Columbia Law Review 
1193, 1217 (1985); Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions 
as a Deterrent, 85 Columbia Law Review 1232, 1249-1250 (1985). 
34 William M. Landes, The Bail System: An Economic Approach, 2 Journal of Legal Studies 79 
(1973). 
35 From equation (5) we can write the net gain from this form of anticipatory adjudication 
(ignoring litigation costs) as pe(1  1)(D  X)  (1  pe)2X, where D > X. 
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5. From Bs standpoint a similar case to that of inadequate resources to satisfy 
a damages judgment is that in which B always suffers a harm equal to D if A acts, 
but, because of difÞculty in establishing the existence or amount of harm or its 
causal relation to the defendants conduct, there is some probability 1  pe that 
the court in an ex post adjudication will deny B any damages or will cut them 
down. B also risks harm from anticipatory adjudication, because, if A gets the go-
ahead to act, B will suffer damages when A acts. But B may still gain from 
anticipatory adjudication if he is more likely to prevent A from acting by 
winning anticipatory adjudication than he is to collect damages by winning ex 
post adjudication. Here, the greater Type II error, the smaller Type I error, and 
the bigger the cost savings of anticipatory adjudication, the more likely is B to 
prefer anticipatory to ex post adjudication.36  
We mentioned the preliminary injunction, ordinarily sought to freeze the 
status quo while a suit either for a permanent injunction or for damages is 
wending its way to completion. The usual reason for seeking a preliminary 
injunction, and a precondition to obtaining it, is that the defendants conduct is 
inßicting irreparable harm on the plaintiffharm that cannot be rectiÞed by the 
Þnal judgment that will be entered at the end of the suit. Freezing the status quo 
may, however, impose irreparable harm on the defendantand that is 
sometimes the real reason for the plaintiffs seeking a preliminary injunction. 
Courts decide whether to grant or deny a preliminary injunction by comparing 
the expected costs to both plaintiff and defendant of the two alternatives. Since 
the decision is anticipatory, it can be modeled, using the same notation as before, 
as follows: grant or deny the preliminary injunction depending on whether paD 
is greater or less than (1  pa)X, where pa is the probability that the plaintiff B will 
win the suit (i.e., that the defendant is violating his rights), estimated before A 
acts; D is the irreparable harm to B if the preliminary injunction is denied; and X 
is the irreparable harm (i.e., the foregone gain) to A, the defendant, if it is 
granted.37 This determination involves an implicit comparison of Type I and 
Type II errors. The greater Type I error, the more likely a court is to deny a 
preliminary injunction when the correct decision would be to grant it; and the 
greater Type II error, the more likely that a preliminary injunction will be 
granted when the correct decision would be to deny it.38 
                                                 
36 Bs expected loss from ex post and anticipatory adjudication equals (1  pe)D + Ce and 
[pe1+ (1  pe)(1  2)]D + Ca. The gain from anticipatory adjudication equals [(1  pe)2  
pe1]D + (Ce  Ca) which is more likely to be positive the greater 2, the smaller pe and 1, and 
the greater Ce  Ca. 
37 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 55354 (4th ed. 1992); American Hospital 
Supply Corp. v. Hospital Products Ltd., 780 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1985). 
38 From (6) we have pa = pe(1  1) +(1  pe)2. Thus, the decision to grant or deny a 
preliminary injunction will depend on whether paD is greater or less than (1  pa)X or whether 
[pe(1  1) + (1  pe)2](D  +  X)   X is greater or less than zero. Thus, the smaller 1 and the 
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Anticipatory breach of contract is a self-help remedy parallel to the 
preliminary injunction. Suppose A and B have a contract, with As performance 
due at time t, and at t  1 A realizes that he will not be able to perform. There is 
no breach as yet, but by declaring breach now, A may be able to reduce D by 
giving B additional time to mitigate his damages by Þnding a substitute 
performer. Similarly, if B has reason to believe that A will not be able to perform 
when performance is due (though A denies this), B is entitled under the Uniform 
Commercial Code to demand adequate assurances of performance from A, 
failing which B can declare a breach and take steps to minimize his damages 
without waiting for A to free him from his contractual obligations. It might seem 
that A would always have an incentive to anticipate the breach, since the legal 
system will shift Bs damages to him through Bs suit for breach of contract and 
those damages will be lower if A has enabled B to reduce the damages. But if Bs 
recovery (d) in a lawsuit instituted after the breach occurs will not fully 
compensate him for his damages (D), Bs self-help remedy may be more effective 
than a suit against A. 
d. Advisory Opinions 
The cost of legal error helps to explain why many state courts are authorized 
to issue advisory opinions, at the request of the states executive or legislative 
branches, often though not always on state constitutional issues, while federal 
courts are not authorized to issue advisory opinions on any subject.39 Because the 
federal constitution is more difÞcult to amend than most state constitutions are, 
the costs of erroneous constitutional interpretations are greater at the federal 
than at the state level. At the state level an erroneous interpretation is less likely 
to prove irreparable; it can usually be corrected by an amendment in short order. 
The corrective remedy at the federal level is slower and costlier. 
Modifying equation (2), we can write the net beneÞt of an advisory opinion 
requested by the government, for the case in which the government will not act 
without a favorable opinion, as 
 Va = (1  pe)(1  2)X  pe1[k(D  X) + c]  Ca, (11) 
where (1  pe)(1  2)X is the expected beneÞt when the government is given 
permission to act and pe1[k(D  X) +c] is the expected harm from a erroneous 
decision allowing the government to act when it shouldnt. X and D (> X) here 
refer to the present value of beneÞts and harms, k denotes the fraction (< 1) of D 
                                                                                                                                                 
greater 2, the more likely that a preliminary injunction will be granted. We note one small 
diVerence between this analysis and our analysis of anticipatory adjudication: in the latter, we 
assumed that X < D whereas in the former X may be greater or less than D. 
39 The prohibition against the issuance of advisory opinions by federal courts is based on (or 
rationalized in terms of) the requirement of justiciability believed to ßow from the limitation of 
the federal judicial power in Article III of the Constitution to cases or controversies. We 
examine justiciability more broadly in subpart f. 
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and X that will be realized before an erroneous decision is corrected, and c is the 
cost of an amendment to correct an erroneous decision. It is obvious from (11) (as 
well as common sense) that allowing the government to obtain advisory 
opinions is more likely to be socially beneÞcial when it is quick and cheap to 
correct an erroneous opinion by an amendment, since that implies low c and k. 
In the case where the government would act in the absence of an advisory 
opinion and an amendment would correct an erroneous decision telling the 
government not to act when it should (Type II error), the net beneÞt of allowing 
advisory opinions is given by 
 Va  Ve = pe(1  1)(D  X)  
   (1  pe)2(kX + c) + (Ce  Ca). (12) 
Here the beneÞt of an advisory opinions lies in preventing the government from 
acting when that is the correct outcome, while the cost lies in sometimes telling 
the government that it cant act when it should. Again the losses from the 
erroneous opinions will be small if they can be corrected by a constitutional 
amendment, so again the quicker and cheaper the amendment process is, the 
more likely the net beneÞt of advisory opinions is to be positive.40 
Consistent with our analysis, we predict and Þnd that advisory opinions are 
more common at the state than at the federal level (federal courts are forbidden 
to issue advisory opinions). At the federal level they are issued only by 
administrative agencies, whose advisory opinions, as we shall see, are readily 
corrected. It is also not unexpected that advisory opinions are generally given 
less precedential weight than opinions in adjudicated cases.41 Courts are less 
likely to follow their advisory opinions than their regular opinions in subsequent 
cases, because the absence from the advisory-opinion setting of both an 
adversary presentation and information generated by experience with the statute 
(which has not yet been enacted) that is being opined on increases the risks of 
error. Giving advisory opinions less precedential weight is like correcting either 
or both Type I and Type II error. If a court in ex post litigation declines to follow 
an incorrect advisory opinion, the potential social loss caused by an erroneous 
advisory opinion would be discounted by k, which would then refer to the 
fraction of such erroneous opinions (weighted by the social loss imposed by 
them) that was not corrected by ex post litigation. 
                                                 
40 If an amendment corrected both Type I and Type II error, equation (11) would become (1  
pe)[X  2(kX + c)]  pe1[k(D  X) + c]  Ca, and the value of an advisory opinion would thus be 
greater the smaller k and c were. 
41 Note, Advisory Opinions on the Constitutionality of Statutes, 69 Harvard Law Review 
1302, 13034 (1956). This is the rule, but Comment, The State Advisory Opinion in Perspective, 
44 Fordham Law Review 81, 82-83 (1975), suggests that in practice advisory opinions of state 
supreme courts are given the same weight as other opinions of those courts. To similar effect, see 
Commentary, Advisory Opinions in Florida: An Experiment in Intergovernmental 
Cooperation, 24 University of Florida Law Review 328, 3323 (1972). 
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The vast majority of advisory opinions concern internal governmental affairs 
(such as the scope of home rule, the extent of the governors veto power, and the 
legality of state or local borrowing) rather than the rights of individuals or 
Þrms.42 This makes sense, since with the normal requirements of standing 
unsatisÞable, a regular adversary proceeding might not result in signiÞcantly 
lower legal error than the advisory-opinion procedure. Although it would be 
somewhat lowerbecause once the statute is in operation its consequences can 
be observed, not just conjectured as when the statute is challenged in advance of 
enactmentwe shall see that adjudications brought by parties who lack standing 
in the traditional sense can involve high legal-error costs. 
Although we can see why states would be more likely to authorize advisory 
opinions than the federal government would be, this of course does not show 
that the costs of allowing federal advisory opinions would outweigh the beneÞts. 
Among the beneÞts would be the considerable savings in the time required to 
dispel legal uncertainty over some statute or other measure; in one state, the 
average time between the request for an advisory opinion and the opinion is a 
remarkable 7.5 days.43 This beneÞt would have to be compared with the increased 
risk of legal error. A further consideration, however, which may help explain the 
rejection of advisory opinions at the federal level, is that beyond a point judicial 
systems encounter severe diseconomies of scale. Increases in demand for judicial 
services, unlike other services, cannot readily be accommodated by creating new 
Þrms (that is, new courts) without undermining consistency of legal doctrine, 
or by enlarging existing courts without greatly increasing decision costs.44 Since 
the federal judiciary is already one of the nations largest and busiest, the cost 
[both the c and Ca in equation (11)] of adding an advisory jurisdiction to it in 
circumstances where the government would not act in the absence of a favorable 
advisory opinion would be considerable.45 True, there is an offsetting savings. 
When the government would act in the absence of an advisory opinion, its act 
may be followed by ex post litigation whose cost [Ce in equation (12)] will be 
saved by an advisory ruling. These savings, however, may be small. The weaker 
precedential signiWcance given to advisory opinions implies that ex post 
litigation will not be eliminated. More important, standing and other doctrines of 
justiciability would prevent ex post litigation in many cases in which 
                                                 
42 Comment, note 39 above, at 106, 1089. 
43 Commentary, note 39 above, at 337. In contrast, a study published in 1962 found that the 
average interval between the enactment of a federal statute and the Supreme Courts decision 
invalidating it was 8.7 years. Note, The Case for an Advisory Function in the Federal Judiciary, 
50 Georgetown Law Journal 785, 800 (1962). 
44 Posner, note 35 above, at 58081. 
45 It may not be an accident that the largest state court systems, such as those of California, 
New York, and Texas, also do not issue advisory opinions. 
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government might have frequent resort to an advisory jurisdiction, for example 
to settle interbranch conßicts that do not affect private rights.  
The analysis in this section thus predicts that the willingness of a state to 
permit its courts to issue advisory opinions will be negatively related both to the 
volume of litigation in the state and to the difÞculty of amending the states 
constitution. These are testable predictions. 
e. The Administrative and Judicial Processes Compared 
The amount of anticipatory adjudication (broadly construed) is vastly greater 
in administrative agencies than in courts. Imagine calling up a judges law clerk 
and asking for legal advice! But that sort of thing is routine in many 
administrative agencies. And rules promulgated in advance of any harm are a 
routine part of administrative activity, while when done by judges they are 
derided as dicta.46 Yet at the same time, declaratory orders, the administrative 
counterpart of declaratory judgments, are extremely rare.47 How to explain this 
pattern? 
The essential point, we conjecture, is that when the costs of adjudication to 
the adjudicative institution itself (courts or agency, as the case may be), as 
distinct from the parties, are incorporated into the cost of litigation, anticipatory 
adjudication is much more costly for courts than for agencies; so is the risk of 
error. Most American courts have general rather than specialized jurisdictions. 
This both increases the number of potential requests for advice or advance rul-
ings and, because the information economies enabled by specialization are not 
available, increases the risk of incremental error if the court does not have the 
beneÞt of a full adversary presentation. Stated differently but equivalently, it 
costs the court more than the agency to reduce the risk of error by the same 
amount. The records on which agencies act in rulemaking proceedings are of 
poor quality compared to trial records (they are full of hearsay and witnesses are 
not subject to cross-examination), but this is not critical because the agency does 
not come to the case without prior knowledge of the subject matter, as would a 
court. 
Courts on the European continent differ from English and American courts in 
being more specialized and in having career judges rather than judges appointed 
                                                 
46 This derision, by the way, illustrates the important general point that anticipatory 
adjudications are likely to have less precedential force than ex post adjudications, because of 
higher error costs. 
47 Burnell V. Powell, Sinners, Supplicants, and Samaritans: Agency Advice Giving in 
Relation to Section 554(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 63 North Carolina Law Review 339 
(1985). However, though not remarked in Professor Powells excellent article, the National Labor 
Relations Board routinely issues something closely akin to declaratory orders. nlrb orders, though 
in form remedial, are not binding until enforced by a court. Often, if the respondent does not 
challenge the order in court but instead indicates his willingness to comply with it, the nlrb will 
not seek judicial enforcement. See nlrb v. p*i*e Nationwide, Inc., 894 F.2d 887 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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(or elected) from practice. We predict that those courts would render 
anticipatory adjudication more freely than Anglo-American courts do. 
Statutes enforced by administrative agencies often prescribe heavy penalties 
for violations of agency rules. This places persons and Þrms subject to those rules 
in a quandary. If they believe that a rule is invalid and violate it in order to 
obtain a judicial determination of its validity, and they are wrong, they will pay a 
heavy penalty [this is the case of a high D with probability pe in equation (1)]. If 
therefore they comply with the rule, they will forgo the opportunity to challenge 
it and they will thus lose a beneÞt equal to X. To prevent these losses, the 
Supreme Court held in the Abbott Laboratories case that persons subject to an 
agency rule can seek declaratory or injunctive relief before the rule goes into 
effect.48 Since the penalties for violating agency rules are sometimes criminal, the 
pre-enforcement judicial review authorized by Abbott Laboratories illustrates 
the operation of anticipatory adjudication in a criminal context. Because losing 
such a review proceeding does not result in the imposition of a criminal 
penaltythe plaintiff has not yet violated the rule, so hasnt yet committed a 
crime even if the rule is validthe criminal burden of proof is not imposed. 
Although the cost of anticipatory adjudication is generally lower to an agency 
than to a court because of greater specialization and larger staff (see next 
paragraph), it might appear puzzling that agencies make less rather than more 
use of declaratory orders than courts do of declaratory judgments. An agency, 
however, has substitute anticipatory procedures that cost less because they do 
not require satisfaction of the conditions of an Article III case or controversy
conditions imposed on courts in declaratory judgment proceedings as in other 
proceedings because of the courts lack of specialized knowledge. 
Advice by agency staff deserves separate consideration. Often such advice is 
not binding, in recognition of the high potential error costs, since the staff has 
less information about the correct decision of the case than the members of the 
agency, who are the authoritative decision makers (commissioners of the ftc, 
members of the nlrb, etc.). This reduces the beneÞts of the advice. At the same 
time, its costs may be very loweven zero. With less to gain or lose from the 
advice, a person wishing advice from the agency may spend little or no money 
on employing a lawyer to frame his request in the manner most likely to elicit a 
favorable ruling. This is a common consequence of the offer of the Internal 
Revenue Service to answer taxpayers questions. The answers have no binding 
effect, so taxpayers do not hesitate to put questions to the irs without bothering 
to obtain the assistance of a lawyer. The irss private letter rulings are binding, so 
                                                 
48 Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). There is a close parallel, outside the 
administrative context, in the rule of Ex Parte Young which permits a declaratory or injunctive 
action for the purpose of testing the validity of a statute before the person bringing the action has 
violated it. See Illinois v. General Electric Co., 683 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1982).  
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taxpayers invariably hire counsel to frame and support the request for such a 
ruling. 
We can see now why it seems so odd to imagine persons being permitted to 
request advice from judges law clerks. Either law clerks would have to be 
trained in rendering advisory opinions over the whole extent of their courts 
jurisdiction, or, if their advice were nonbinding, they would be ßooded with 
requests for nonbinding advice because persons making such requests would not 
have to hire lawyers to frame the requestin effect they would be hiring the 
law clerks, at zero cost, as their lawyers. Either way, the character of judicial 
staffs would be transformed. This hypothetical situation underscores our earlier 
point that anticipatory adjudication is unlikely to be worthwhile when all it does 
is replace private legal advice. 
f. Justiciability 
The legal term justiciability refers to the complex of limitations on federal 
judicial competence that has been found to be implicit in Article III of the 
Constitution. The plaintiff must actually have been (or be about to be) injured by 
the defendants conduct (standing). The relief sought by the plaintiff must 
actually be beneÞcial to him (mootness). The parties dispute must have pro-
gressed to the point where it is plain that they have a dispute (ripeness), so 
ordinarily a person cannot challenge the constitutionality of a statute if it is 
unclear whether the statute will even be applied to him. The dispute must be 
real, not contrived or collusive. If any of these requirements is not satisÞed, the 
suit will be dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff is seeking an advisory 
opinion. 
The concept of justiciability can be interpreted, though only in part, as a 
limitation on anticipatory adjudication. For example, if an ex post suit is unripe, 
or we cant tell whether the plaintiff B is likely actually to be injured, the suit 
becomes equivalent to anticipatory adjudication with substantial legal error (1 
and 2). It is not strictly anticipatory, because A has acted; but a more realistic 
view of action would make it comprehend the entire sequence of acts that 
must occur before there will be full information about As and Bs legal 
entitlements. So if A has acted (perhaps by passing a statute potentially but not 
certainly applicable to B) but the impact of the act on B is not yet determinable 
(perhaps because the scope of the statute is unclear and has yet to be deÞned by 
the government agency responsible for enforcing it), an immediate suit by B to 
invalidate the statute would be, functionally, anticipatory.49 
B would have an interest in bringing such a suit if his expected recovery were 
greater than if he waited. This condition is more likely to be fulÞlled the smaller 
                                                 
49 Suits for injunctions, or motions for preliminary injunctions, which we have classiÞed as 
anticipatory, are usually of the same character: the defendant has already acted, but the plaintiV 
sues before he has been injured, or injured badly. 
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Type I error is (by which A would escape liability for harming B); the greater 
Type II error (for such error means that B collects from an innocent Aone 
who would be exonerated from liability in a ripe suit); and the greater the 
litigation cost savings to B from an early suit.50 We showed in part I that the 
greater Type I and Type II error is, the lower is the social beneÞt of anticipatory 
adjudication and the more likely that the beneÞt will actually be negative. So 
deeming a suit unripe is a convenient label for refusing to adjudicate a dispute 
when the social beneÞt from waiting probably exceeds the increase in cost, if any, 
of deferring adjudication until more information is available. In some cases there 
will be no increase in cost from waiting: Either the availability of additional 
information facilitates convergent estimates of a trial outcome and so makes 
settlement more likely, or Bs fear that As action will injure him proves 
groundless so that there is no ex post litigation at all. 
In the case of a collusive suit, which often will be motivated by the parties 
desire to obtain authoritative legal advice in order to guide their choice of 
actions, the court will lack the beneÞt of an adversary presentation. The 
likelihood of legal error will again be great. Anglo-American courts lack 
adequate staff to investigate and resolve factual and legal questions without the 
aid of the parties, and that aid will be warped if the parties agree on the 
outcome of the case. As in the case of an unripe suit, greater legal error will 
reduce the beneÞt of both anticipatory and ex post adjudication. 
Let us examine the case in which, after a full trial and a decision by the trial 
court, and while the case is pending on appeal, something happens to moot the 
case. Maybe the plaintiff was a food distributor suing for permission to sell some 
exotic food that he had imported into this country, the food had been 
impounded pending the resolution of the suit, and while impounded the food 
spoiled and now can no longer be sold. The appeals court will dismiss the suit as 
moot, without reaching the merits. And yet, on the one hand, since all the 
relevant facts bearing on the controversy over the denial of permission exist and 
are unaffected by the fact that the case has become moot, error costs would not 
be increased by the appeals courts deciding the case; while, on the other hand, 
since the plaintiff can no longer beneÞt from winning the suit, why doesnt he 
just abandon it, in which event the issue of mootness would itself be moot? The 
Þrst point suggests that cases shouldnt be dismissed on grounds of mootness, 
the second that the issue of mootness is unlikely to arise. 
The point about error costs is correct. The second point, however, ignores the 
fact that once the case has been submitted and is awaiting decision, As 
                                                 
50 Let Bs expected recovery equal paD  Ca in the unripe suit and peD  Ce in the ripe suit 
where pa and pe are deÞned as beforepa reXects legal error because the suit being unripe is 
anticipatory. The diVerence between Bs expected recovery in the unripe and ripe suit will equal 
[(1  pe)2  pe1)]D + (Ce  Ca) which is more likely to be positive the greater 2, the smaller 1, 
and the greater Ce  Ca. 
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incremental litigation cost is zero and A may expect to undertake similar acts in 
the future. Thus the issue becomes one of anticipatory adjudicationthe value of 
a decision in the present case provides guidance or resolution in a subsequent 
suit. In our hypothetical case, a decision that provides information on the 
lawfulness of As acteven though Bs dropping the case gives A the go-ahead 
to act now and receive Xmay be valuable to A because he thinks he may 
someday want to import a similar food again. A favorable decision will have 
precedential value to him, while an adverse decision will allow him to escape a 
future liability by avoiding the commission of an act that is sure to be sanctioned. 
But it is unclear whether the social beneÞt from deciding a moot case is positive. 
Apart from the cost to the judiciary of deciding the case, the beneÞt of the 
decision will be less than if the parties had an actual dispute to be settled, 
because the probability of their having a future dispute is less than 1. 
Nevertheless, the legal-error costs are lower than in other cases where 
anticipatory adjudication is refused. In the special case of an issue capable of 
repetition but avoiding judicial review (say the legality of abortion, where a 
challenge to an abortion statute will be mooted after nine months by the birth of 
the child, but the woman anticipates a subsequent pregnancy that she may want 
to abort), courts allow a moot case to be decided. The case is technically moot 
because by the time it is decided the woman will have either had the abortion or 
had the child. But since ex post adjudication is therefore infeasibleshould she 
again get pregnant and again sue to invalidate the statute she will again be un-
able to obtain an adjudication before her pregnancy endsthe incremental legal-
error costs of anticipatory adjudication are actually negative, because 
anticipatory adjudication is the only available method of avoiding an erroneous 
denial of legal rights. 
In all of these cases, although we have been emphasizing error costs, an 
equally important consideration is that the value of anticipatory adjudication is 
less, the smaller the likelihood that ex post adjudication will occur if anticipatory 
adjudication is refused. A central concern of the case or controversy 
requirement of Article III (which subsumes such doctrines as ripeness, mootness, 
no advisory opinions, and standing) is with avoiding the costs of anticipatory 
adjudication when the adjudication is likely to be not a substitute for an ex post 
adjudication but a net addition to the judicial workload. 
When we turn to the doctrine of standing, we encounter an aspect of 
justiciability that is only tangentially related to anticipatory adjudication, 
although the underlying concern with legal error as a basis for refusing 
adjudication is similar. The conventional rationale for the requirement of 
standing is that if a plaintiff isnt tangibly hurt by the defendants conduct, or, 
hurt or not, doesnt have anything tangible to gain from a judgment against the 
defendant, he wont put up a good Þght and the court will face a one-sided 
presentation, which will increase the risk of legal error. This is the ground on 
which federal taxpayers are barred from bringing suits to challenge public 
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spending programs that may result in an increase in federal income tax rates and 
citizens are barred from challenging government programs that they dislike but 
cant demonstrate a common law type of injury from (maybe the challenged 
program degrades the environmentin another country). Yet it is apparent that 
the organizations which bring such suits have both the desire and the resources 
to mount a vigorous defense of their position, so that the court will in fact have 
the beneÞt of a balanced adversary presentation of the relevant factual and legal 
issues. 
Two economic rationales can be conjectured for the doctrine of standing 
when it is applied to bar suits by nonvictims. The Þrst, illustrated by the 
examples of taxpayer and citizen suits, is that it cuts down on the role of interest 
groups in the litigation process, perhaps in recognition that, almost by deÞnition, 
such groups have effective political remedies. Second, in some cases rules of 
standing are necessary in order to allocate property rights to legal claims. If A 
violates Bs legal rights to Bs injury, but anyone can sue to redress the violation, 
Bs rights may be illusory. Lacking effective legal protection, he may substitute 
some less efÞcient method of self-protection. Potential tort victims, for example, 
may take excessive care to avoid being injured, if their ability to obtain 
compensation for a tortious injury is undermined by a litigation derby, even 
though it might be more efÞcient for potential injurers to take more care instead. 
The social function of legal rights will therefore be impaired.51 
Conclusion 
We have developed an economic model to examine a variety of issues united 
by the common thread that a person or Þrm is seeking a ruling from a court or 
agency in advance of the sort of actual or imminently threatened harm that is 
required for a classic adjudication. We have argued that the traditional 
reluctance of generalist courts, such as the federal courts, to engage in 
anticipatory adjudication can be explained on economic grounds. We further 
have argued that the apparent exceptions to this reluctance, as well as the more 
receptive attitude of administrative agencies toward anticipatory adjudication, 
can also be explained in terms of the elements of our model. Our analysis 
suggests that there are many issues within the forbidding (to economists) 
domain of federal jurisdiction and administrative law that can be illuminated by 
economics, as well as connected with the aid of economics to subjects, such as res 
judicata, criminal punishment of preparatory acts, preliminary injunctions, and 
anticipatory breaches of contract, that generally are believed to belong to 
separate and unrelated Þelds of law. 
                                                 
51 In an earlier article we analyzed the beneÞts of giving victims a property right in their suit 
rather than allocating this right on a Þrst come, Þrst serve or other basis. See William M. Landes 
and Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 Journal of Legal Studies 1 (1975). 
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